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The determinants of apprenticeship training with
particular reference to business expectations*
Hans Dietrich and Hans-Dieter Gerner**
Whilst in applied empirical research, training in general human capital is mainly ex-
plained by structural characteristics of firms, this paper introduces business expecta-
tions as an additional explanatory factor. Business expectations are strictly time-variate
and firm-specific and reflect both a firm’s development in competitive markets and in
the business cycle. We assume that a firm’s business expectations strongly modify the
cost-utility concept for firms’ decisions as regards providing apprenticeship places.
When controlling for firms’ structural characteristics, static econometric models sup-
port our assumption that a change in business expectations leads to an asymmetric
adjustment process of firms’ qualitative decisions regarding apprenticeship training.
Concerning the quantitative decision as to how many apprenticeship places a firm
provides we found a significant but not asymmetric response to a change in business
expectations.
A dynamic approach confirms the results obtained in the static models of a symmetric
quantitative adjustment process in a short-term perspective. In a longer perspective
the dynamic model supports the assumption of an asymmetric quantitative adjustment
process. Further on an application shows that an increasing uncertainty regarding busi-
ness expectations tends to reduce the apprenticeship training at firm level.
* This paper was released for publication in September 2007.
** We thank Lutz Bellmann, Anette Haas, Thorsten Schank, and two anonymus referees for valuable com-
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1 Introduction
Since the mid-eighties firms’ provision of appren-
ticeship places has decreased dramatically in the old
German Länder. Whilst in 1986 firms provided some
700,000 new apprenticeship contracts, there were
only about 450,000 in 2006. This process has found
its continuation in unified Germany since the early
nineties. Both sectoral change and the restructuring
of enterprises have been identified as the driving
mechanisms behind this development. In addition to
this structural change, microeconomic studies pro-
vide some evidence that firms’ human capital pro-
file, their internal on-the-job training and further
training or recruitment strategies and firm-size char-
acteristics explain firms’ provision of apprenticeship
places more or less stably over time (Neubäumer/
Bellmann 1999; Dietrich 2000; Beckmann 2002;
Euwals/Winkelmann 2004; Niederalt 2004; Dietrich/
Gerner 2005; Muehlemann et al. 2007).
Besides these firm-specific characteristics of busi-
ness organisation, recent literature indicates some
arguments that uncertainty concerning the further
development of business success influences firms’
future provision of new apprenticeship places
(DIHK 2006; Bellmann/Hartung 2005). The aim of
this paper is to introduce business expectations and
uncertainty into microeconomic models explaining
firms’ qualitative and quantitative decisions about
providing apprenticeship places. According to our
considerations, firms’ business expectations reflect
both firms’ expected performance in competitive
markets and macroeconomic factors such as the ex-
pected progress of the business cycle. In this respect
business expectations as a core element of firms’ ra-
tional decisions are associated with uncertainty in
a more general sense. A more specific concept of
uncertainty, discussed in more detail in section 5, is
adapting a risk concept formulated by Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970).
In the remainder of the paper, on the basis of hu-
man capital theory, explanations of firms’ provision
of apprenticeship places (Becker 1964; Harhoff/
Kane 1997; Acemoglu/Pischke 1998, 1999a and b;
Clark/Fahr 2002; Niederalt 2004) are extended by
introducing business expectations as an exogenous
variable. Compared with more static variables de-
scribing firms’ characteristics of organisation and
workforce, business expectations seem to be more
variable over time. Furthermore we adopt theoreti-
cal and empirical considerations about asymmetric
processes of adjustment of firms’ training decisions
to changes in business expectations.
In the empirical section of this paper we use data
from the IAB Establishment Panel. In a first analyti-
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cal step, a static approach is applied to answer two
questions: a) what factors motivate firms to train ap-
prentices (qualitative decision) and b) what happens
to the number of apprentices recruited by a firm
when these causal factors vary over time (quantita-
tive decision). Subsequently a dynamic approach is
used to model the adjustment process for the quan-
titative decision. In an application we use our results
to formulate assumptions about the effect of uncer-
tainty regarding business expectations over time on
a firm’s quantitative and qualitative decision as to
whether to provide new apprenticeship places in a
given year or not.
2 Theoretical considerations
Why do firms pay for apprenticeship training (regu-
lated by the German vocational training act, BBiG),
even if apprenticeship training is an investment in
general human capital? Becker already raised this
question in the early sixties (see Becker 1962; 1964)
and Acemoglu/Pischke (1999a, b) and Niederalt
(2004) reviewed in detail the ongoing research espe-
cially related to the German apprenticeship system.
In particular two types of training costs can be dis-
tinguished: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are
for example expenditure on firm-based training fa-
cilities or wages for apprentices. Indirect costs occur
while workers spend part of their working time on
training apprentices instead of on production. A net
cost perspective takes into account the fact that
even apprentices may be productive while being
trained. Calculations by Beicht and Walden (2004)
present a remarkable variation of net training costs,
explained partly by firm size, industry and the type
of occupation that apprentices are being trained in.
Concepts motivated by net cost are closely related
to assumptions derived from production-theory con-
siderations (see Lindley 1975; Fouge `re/Schwerdt
2002; Zwick 2007). Also, a specific type of firm is
able to gain net returns from investments in general
training already during the training period.
In general, production-motivated explanations are
not sufficient to explain firms’ training activities in
apprenticeship training. So it is also worth noting
that considerations oriented towards net cost only
take into account costs and returns occurring during
the institutionally defined period of contract-based
apprenticeship training. Opportunity costs or trans-
action costs (e.g. recruitment costs for skilled em-
ployees) may occur, however, when this type of
training is completed. These types of costs are not
considered here. Investment-motivated considera-Hans Dietrich and Hans-Dieter Gerner The determinants of apprenticeship training
tions (Stevens 1994; Franz/Soskice 1995; Timmer-
mann 1998; Fouge `re/Schwerdt 2002) reflect the re-
turns on training after the completion of an appren-
ticeship. From this viewpoint, apprenticeship train-
ing improves not only productivity during the train-
ing period but also future productivity. High
mobility costs for workers, institutional barriers and
low labour turnover in Germany (Harhoff/Kane
1997), asymmetric information on the ability of the
apprentices and other market imperfections gener-
ate compressed wage structures and allow firms pro-
viding apprenticeship training to take a rent from
employees trained within the firm compared with
firms who recruit employees on the labour market
(Acemoglu/Pischke 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Beckmann
2002; Clark/Fahr 2002). Following Franz/Soskice
(1995) and Werwatz (1996) apprenticeship training
provides additional firm-specific skills. According to
assumptions on high factor specificity (Holtbrügge
2004; Williamson 1990) training firms may have ad-
ditional advantages from this firm-specific human
capital which is generated en-passant.1
Increasing or decreasing business expectations, how-
ever, affect both the cost and the reward sides of
apprenticeship training. Decreasing business expec-
tations indicate to training firms an expected reduc-
tion in the productive contribution of apprentices to
the firm. As a consequence the net costs of appren-
ticeship training may increase and training firms will
reduce their provision of training capacities. A pre-
condition for long-term returns on firm-based train-
ing is that firms will be able to retain apprentices
after the training period. As labour demand depend
on the demand for goods (Freemann 1972), the fu-
ture market position must be sufficient to retain the
apprentices who are currently undergoing training.
When offering new apprenticeship places, firms
have to make their decisions under uncertainty. So
business expectations could be a relevant indicator
in firms’ decisions. Expanding on Acemoglu/Pischke
(1999a, 1999b), a reduction in business expectations
should decrease not only the probability of firms re-
taining their own apprentices afterwards but also the
probability of using them productively during the
apprenticeship training. As a consequence this will
increase the expected net costs of training.
Supported by empirical evidence, assumptions from
behavioural finance suggest that a deficit of a given
amount is perceived by actors more sorely, than
earnings of the same amount increase individual
1 Alternative training motives such as a reputation motive (Sa-
dowski 1980), a stock-keeping motive especially of larger firms
(Backes-Gellner 1992) or industry-specific arguments (Büchel/
Neubäumer 2001) are not taken into account here.
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utility Ð this paradox motivates so-called loss aver-
sion (Bank 2003; Gul 1991). Given a loss-averse be-
haviour, actors will renounce investments more eas-
ily with a given decrease in business expectations
than they will make investments in the opposite
case. In this respect, firms’ training decisions should
correspond with asymmetric investment or adjust-
ment decisions. We assume that firms will reduce
their training facility to a greater extent than they
would intensify their training facilities in the case
that business expectations improved to the same ex-
tent.
From a human-capital theory perspective, firms’
training behaviour depends on enterprise-specific
characteristics such as the human capital distribu-
tion of the employees, recruiting strategy, industry
or firm size (Neubäumer/Bellmann 1999; Dietrich
2000; Dietrich/Gerner 2005; Niederalt 2004, 2005;
Zwick 2007).
3 Econometric analysis Ð Part 1:
static approach
3.1 Econometric strategy, data, variables
and hypothesis
Analytically there are two basic management deci-
sions Ð first a qualitative decision: either the firm
trains apprentices or it does not, and second the
quantitative decision: how many apprentices are to
be trained by an individual firm (Niederalt 2004,
2005).
To model the qualitative decision, we apply logit
techniques. To use the structure of the data, we con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating
both a logit model with random effects (see Conway
1990; Liu/Pierce 1994) and a logit model with fixed
effects (Chamberlain 1980). A Hausman test is em-
ployed to identify the most appropriate approach
for interpretation, given the assumptions made.2
The quantitative decision is modelled by using linear
regressions. Again fixed effects and random effects
models are calculated to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity (Arellano 2003). A Hausman test sup-
ports the decision regarding the model adequacy.
The data used for the econometric analysis are de-
rived from the IAB Establishment Panel. These data
2 A Hausman test is applied to decide whether the coefficients of
a random effects model Ð which is the default Ð are biased. In
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are collected annually by means of personal inter-
views with managers of a randomised sample of
firms. In western Germany the first wave of the IAB
Establishment Panel was carried out in 1993; since
1996 the sample has also covered eastern Germany.
The IAB Establishment Panel is a multiply stratified
sample of all German firms which have at least one
employee covered by social security (Kölling 2001).
The fact that the panel is unbalanced (Bellmann
et al. 2002) is ignored in our analysis.3 The subsam-
ple used for this paper does not include firms with
fewer than ten employees. Such smaller firms would
hardly be able to recruit new apprentices every year.
The endogenous variable in our logit analyses is a
dummy which is zero for enterprises which do not
recruit an apprentice in a given year and is one if
at least one new training contract is concluded. The
endogenous variable in the linear regressions is
given by the rate of change of the number of new
apprenticeship contracts against the previous year.4
In both models we introduce a given set of exoge-
nous variables. The variable “short-term business
expectations” uses information which is measured
directly. In each panel wave since 1993 firms have
been asked to answer the question: “How do you
expect the business volume to develop in the current
year (t), as compared with the previous year (t-1)?
Is it expected to remain constant, to increase or to
decrease?” In the case of change, the change in per-
centage points is asked for. For our analysis we
make use of the given raw scores. We assume a posi-
tive correlation of the exogenous variable “change
in business expectations” with both endogenous
training variables. In addition a dummy variable is
constructed which has the value of one if the sign of
the change in business expectations is negative and
this variable interacts with the business expecta-
tions.5 The influence of this new variable is expected
to be positive.6 This strategy enables us to identify
3 Following Nijman/Verbeek (1992) unit non response in unbal-
anced panels should be at random; which is the case with the IAB
establishment panel (Hartmann/Kohaut 2000).
4 Ratet =N tÐNtÐ1/NtÐ1; with Nt = number of new apprentices in
time t.
5 Alternative models were estimated, including the dummy itself;
the results show no significant effect either of the dummy itself
or of the interaction term for the OLS model; we therefore use
the reduced form here. Analogously we estimated both variants
for the logit model. Again, from a qualitative viewpoint, the two
models show identical results.
6 As e.g. Ai/Norton (2003) mentioned, the use of interaction
terms in nonlinear models such as logit models causes some fun-
damental problems. In the given case, however, the coefficient
for business expectations and the interaction term identifying a
negative change should just be interpreted simultaneously. Addi-
tional effects result from the control variables. In detail a mar-
ginal reduction in business expectations will be compared to the
reference situation in the representative firm; the reference situa-
tion is defined by business expectations of 0% and the represent-
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different coefficients depending on the sign of the
business expectations (descriptive statistics of the
exogenous variables can be found in Tables A1 and
A2 in the appendix).
A further set of exogenous variables serves mainly
to control for observed heterogeneity of firms. The
share of skilled employees among all employees ran-
ges between zero and one and is an indicator of
firms’ demand for skilled workers. As we assume,
firms recruit at least some of their skilled staff from
their apprentices, the correlation between this varia-
ble and the training behaviour of the firms should
be positive.
The technical state of the firm should influence the
training decision in a positive way (Franz et al.
2000). As there is an expected complementarity be-
tween human capital and physical capital (Filer et
al. 1996), especially firms using the latest technology
are limited when recruiting skilled staff on the la-
bour market. Firms with state-of-the-art technology
are coded with a value of one whereas firms using
obsolete technology are coded with five.
The staff turnover rate as the share of personnel
outflow as a percentage of the total number of em-
ployees has a serious impact on the investment mo-
tive of apprenticeship training. In case the invest-
ment motive is decisive for the training decision we
assume a negative effect, as firms’ returns from
training seem to be limited. Analogously we expect
the effect of staff turnover for the quantitative deci-
sion.
The share of atypical workers, such as freelancers
or agency workers, in the workforce should have a
negative influence because enterprises which make
considerable use of these groups of workers are ex-
pected to recruit know-how from outside. A rate of
100 % is given a value of one.
Collective bargaining often includes negotiations
about firm-based apprenticeship training. Firms
which are involved in such negotiations are more
likely to opt for apprenticeship training and will also
recruit more apprentices.
The probability of recruiting at least one apprentice
is simply correlated with firm size, measured in
ative firm by the mean vector of the remaining exogenous varia-
bles. Statistical significance of the gross effect of a negative
change is to be identified by a simple Wald test; the identification
of the standard error using the so-called delta method (see Ai/
Norton 2003; Norton et al. 2004; Xu/Long 2005; Oehlert 1992) is
not required.Hans Dietrich and Hans-Dieter Gerner The determinants of apprenticeship training
terms of the number of employees; however there
are no precise arguments concerning the intensity of
apprenticeship training.
Industry dummy variables control for the primary,
manufacturing and services sectors. Compared with
other sectors the manufacturing industry has a long
tradition of apprenticeship training and up to now
apprenticeship training has taken place there in very
specific training occupations; furthermore training is
less school-based and more practical in this field. Fi-
nally time dummies are included.
3.2 Results of the static analysis
The results of the logit estimates can be found in
table 1. The signs for significant coefficients are
equal in both the random effects and the fixed ef-
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fects model. A Hausman test favours the random
effects model; so the interpretations are based on
this model.
Whereas improvements in business expectations do
not have an influence on the probability of recruit-
ing at least one new apprentice, an influence can
be seen if business expectations are decreasing. In
a representative firm the probability decreases by
around 0.3 percentage points if business expecta-
tions fall by one percentage point; this effect is
highly significant.
The technical state of the firm and the existence of
collective bargaining do have the expected positive
influence on the training decision. Following the as-
sumption of a complementary relationship between
physical and human capital, the training probability
increases with the technical state. What is remark-The determinants of apprenticeship training Hans Dietrich and Hans-Dieter Gerner
able is the fact that this probability increases if an
enterprise changes from the status “there is no col-
lective bargaining” to the status “there is collective
bargaining” and vice versa Ð the marginal effect in
the representative firm being four percentage
points.
The results confirm a positive correlation between
the number of employees and a firm’s training activ-
ity. It is more or less plausible that the training prob-
ability increases with firm size. The relative entry
cost into apprenticeship training decreases as firm
size increases.
The share of skilled employees improves a firm’s
probabilityofrecruitingnewapprentices,andfirmsin
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the manufacturing sector are more likely to train ap-
prentices than other firms. Firms with a high staff
turnover tend to abstain from concluding new ap-
prenticeshipcontracts.Finallynosignificantinfluence
can be found from the share of atypical workers.
Table 2 displays the results of the linear regressions;
a Hausman test prefers the fixed effects model.
However, the signs of the significant coefficients are
again the same in the two estimated models.
An improvement in the business expectations by one
percentage point induces an improvement in the vo-
cational training engagement of 0.4 percentage
points Ð an asymmetric behaviour like in the logit
modelscannotbefound.Staffturnoverhasadecreas-Hans Dietrich and Hans-Dieter Gerner The determinants of apprenticeship training
ing effect. The share of atypical workers has a signifi-
cant positive influence, which is not in line with our
expectations.Plausible,however,isthepositivecorre-
lation between a change in the number of employees
and a change in the vocational training engagement.
Moreover the estimations indicate a positive influ-
ence of the share of skilled employees and the exis-
tence of collective bargaining, whereas the coeffi-
cients are supposed to be inconsistent. The weak ex-
planatory power, however, is unsatisfying; both mod-
els only explain about one per cent of the variance.
Altogether it can be concluded that structural deter-
minants obviously do have a greater influence on
the decision as to whether a firm should provide at
least one new apprenticeship than on the extent of
engagement in vocational training. Therefore
changes in the German economy, especially the
change from an industrial to a services economy,
have probably reduced the number of firms which
provide apprenticeships at all. Indications regarding
a cyclical dependence are quite different in the two
approaches. Thus the coefficients for the business
expectations do have the expected signs, at least
when they are significant. In contrast, however, the
fact that an improvement in business expectations
does not influence the probability of opting for new
training at all is surprising. The estimations indicate
that the extent of engagement in training depends
on improvements and also on negative develop-
ments in business expectations. Asymmetric behav-
iour seems to occur in the logit case only. One possi-
ble reason for this result is the fact that until now
we have ignored possible dynamic aspects, which are
quite plausible because reaction takes time. This
consideration is the subject of the next section.
4 Econometric analysis Ð Part 2:
dynamic approach
4.1 Econometric model, data and
variables
In this section we model explicitly dynamic aspects
by estimating an “autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) model” with fixed effects. In our strategy we
follow Sheldon (2003). Adapting the model to our
question we use as explanatory variables not only
the business expectations in t but also the business
expectations lagged for several periods and the
lagged information on new apprenticeship contracts.
Fixed effects control for additional firm-specific fac-
tors influencing the training decision such as the
qualification level of the firm’s workforce, the indus-
try of the enterprise or firm size. It should be noted
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that Sheldon (2003) estimated an error correction
model (EC), but due to the fact that these two ap-
proaches (ADL and EC) are structurally identical,
the method to control for unobserved heterogeneity
by ordinary within transformation can be applied to
ADL directly.7
If the residuals in an ADL model are independent
and identically distributed (iid) and there is not a
unit root in the variables, an OLS model usually
leads to consistent parameter estimates (Verbeek
2002; Beck 2005). In particular serially correlated er-
rors cause serious problems in this context (Beck
2005; Wolters 2003; Baltagi 1998). To avoid this
problem we choose the appropriate lag structure,
based on a Breusch-Godfrey test. Another problem
could, however, arise from the fact that the within
transformation induces another endogeneity prob-
lem in a dynamic model by construction (Greene
2003). As our model selection is based on a Breusch-
Godfrey test, the resulting inconsistency problem
should be small.8
Following Carruth/Dickerson (2003), we define a
dummy variable and include an interaction term be-
tween this dummy and the exogenous and endoge-
nous variables in our estimates (the dummy has the
value of one if business expectations are negative)
to model a possible asymmetry.
Box 1 illustrates the model selection process in a
simplified form. The application of this procedure
suggests the following model:
yi,t = αi + Θ1yi,tÐ1 + Θ2yi,tÐ2 + Θ3δi,tδi,tÐ1δi,tÐ2yi,tÐ2
+ Θ4yi,tÐ3 + ø1xi,t + ø1xi,tÐ2 + λt + εi,t
With:
αi: Firm-specific effect (fixed effect)
yi,t: Rate of change of the number of new
apprenticeship contracts against the
previous year, firm i in year t
xi,t: Business expectations, firm i in year t
δi,t: Dummy which has the value of one if
the sign of the business expectations is
negative, firm i in year t
λt: Time-specific effect
εi,t: Error term.
7 It would also be plausible to use a vector autoregressive model
with fixed effects. As the endogeneity or causality is clear, how-
ever, we preferred ADL (Hsiao 2004; Verbeek 2002). Up to now
dynamic panel models controlling for selectivity are not common;
besides a lack of implemented standard statistics programmes, the
main argument for not including selectivity in the models is the
extent of complexity.
8 Another indication in this direction is the fact that the differ-
ence between the coefficients of the business expectations in t is
not statistically significant in the static and the dynamic models,
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Our approach opens up the opportunity to identify
differences in firms’ adjustment behaviour depend-
ing on whether business expectations are good or
bad for just one period or for a longer time. More-
over it is possible to see asymmetries in the adjust-
ment behaviour of the firms. One central assump-
tion is that a firm immediately changes its adjust-
ment scheme if the sign of business expectations
changes. What is quite interesting is the result that
Wald tests do not find a significant influence of the
interaction term between the dummy and the exoge-
nous variable, which is in line with the results in the
static case.
The estimates are again based on the IAB Establish-
ment Panel. The exogenous variable is again busi-
ness expectations compared with the activity a year
earlier. As in the static model, the endogenous vari-
able is the change in the number of new apprentice-
ship contracts compared with the previous year Ð
we take the rate of change. Again we only take firms
into account which have at least ten employees; the
fact that the IAB Establishment Panel is “unbal-
anced” is also ignored.
4.2 Results of the dynamic analysis
The results can be found in Table 3. As mentioned
above, firms’ responses to business expectations are
symmetrical with respect to the direction if we look
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at the short run Ð in the case of a positive (negative)
change in business expectations of one percentage
point, the engagement in vocational training in-
creases (decreases) by 0.35 percentage points. It
should be mentioned that the result is really in line
with those obtained in the static case, the difference
is statistically insignificant. In the case that the sign
of business expectations does not vary for a longer
time (for at least three periods) firms choose a lower
equilibrium rate of change in the negative case, al-
though the asymmetry is not really significant (0.21
percentage points in the positive case to 0.185 in the
negative case). Finally the strong quantitative corre-
lation between the exogenous and the endogenous
variables is quite interesting. This indicates a strong
cyclical dependence of the supply of apprentice-
ships.
One possible economic explanation for the identi-
fied (weak) asymmetry could be the fact that firms,
irrespective of cyclical factors, train something like
a supplement amount, which is not “touched” in theHans Dietrich and Hans-Dieter Gerner The determinants of apprenticeship training
case of short-term decreases in business expecta-
tions. Such an explanation could be justified with the
theory of internal labour markets (Saint-Paul 1996;
Doeringer/Piore 1971).
5 Application of the estimates
Increasing uncertainty regarding the economic fu-
ture has been mentioned recently by various authors
as being an influential factor for a decreasing com-
mitment of firms to training apprentices (Bellmann/
Hartung 2005; DIHK 2006). Within this paper in-
creasing uncertainty is defined as an increase in the
changes of the sign of business expectations, whilst
the mean of the individual firms’ business expecta-
tions remains constant. This definition is in line with
the risk concept of Rothschild/Stiglitz (1970), which
defines an increase in risk as a “mean preserving
spread”. Moreover, it should be mentioned that,
strictly speaking, uncertainty and risk are two differ-
ent concepts, but it is usual to ignore this difference
if this distinction is not the subject of the paper (Mil-
ler 2002).9
Taking a look at the estimates regarding the proba-
bility of providing training, business expectations
only induce firms to change from the status “new
apprenticeships” to “no new apprenticeships”. Un-
certainty as defined above would obviously lead to
a reduction in the number of firms which provide
training.
Finally both the static and the dynamic models indi-
cate that there is no asymmetry in firms’ behaviour
as regards adjustment to business expectations in
the short run. Thus a negative reaction regarding en-
gagement in vocational training, induced by poor
business expectations, reduces the basis (the level of
the engagement) so considerably that a subsequent
symmetric positive reaction induced by good busi-
ness expectations would be not strong enough to
compensate for the reduction. In the long run how-
ever, the dynamic estimates give an indication that
negative reactions are less sensitive, but it is clearly
doubtful that it makes sense to simulate increasing
uncertainty by some long-run changes in the sign of
the business expectations (which means the sign
does not change until the rate of change of the en-
gagement in vocational training is in equilibrium), if
9 As an alternative to this purely experimental approach it would
be possible to include uncertainty directly into the econometric
analysis. One way to do so could be to include a dummy variable
which indicates that the firm has no idea of their business expec-
tations. Such a variable, however, has no statistical significant in-
fluence in our static analysis.
ZAF 2 und 3/2007 229
it is taken into account that in the model context
long term means around six years and the estima-
tions are based on only seven years. Moreover some
long-run changes in the sign of business expectations
are usually not recognised as increasing uncertainty
but more or less as changes in profit expectations.
Hence the conclusion seems to be justified that in-
creasing uncertainty regarding future prospects, for
example business expectations, could be a reason for
the decreasing amount of apprenticeship arrange-
ments.
6 Conclusions and further options
The econometric estimations based on the IAB Es-
tablishment Panel data provide some evidence that
firms respond sensitively to changes in short-term
business expectations and adapt their training be-
haviour correspondingly. These findings correspond
with a strong interrelation between training behav-
iour and the business cycle.
In a short-term perspective, a decrease in business
expectations affects the net cost assumptions of
firms’ training decisions. From a perspective ori-
ented towards long-term investment, a decrease in
business expectations affects the assumptions on fu-
ture transaction and opportunity costs.
The empirical findings provide some evidence that
the sectoral change from the manufacturing industry
to the services industry explains some of the reduc-
tion in the supply of apprenticeship places, as the
density of apprenticeship places in the manufactur-
ing sector is higher than in the services sector.
Furthermore there is some empirical evidence that
firms’ departure from collective wage agreements
(see Schnabel 2003) reduces both the decision to
provide training and the number of training places.
But more research is needed to decide whether the
two decisions are interrelated or not.
As assumed, the logit model provides some empiri-
cal evidence of asymmetric behaviour of firms; these
findings correspond with our assumptions on the
loss-averse behaviour of firms. Again alternative hy-
potheses have still to be tested: the costs of entry
into apprenticeship training are higher than exit
costs. How does this cost asymmetry affect firms’
training behaviour? It is surprising, however, that in
the static model the decision to provide apprentice-
ship training seems to be independent of businessThe determinants of apprenticeship training Hans Dietrich and Hans-Dieter Gerner
expectations, in contrast to the decision against pro-
viding apprenticeship training.
According to our assumptions, firms’ adjustment of
their training capacities is positively correlated with
the direction of the change in business expectations.
However, there is no empirical evidence for the ex-
pected asymmetric adjustment behaviour in the
static model and an inverse, but weak correlation in
the dynamic model.
The empirical findings are in line with our assump-
tions about the correlation between increasing un-
certainty regarding business expectations and the
training behaviour. What needs to be done is to im-
plement our assumptions directly in the econometric
modelling.
With respect to these limitations, however, it was
possible to show that our empirical results concern-
ing the firms’ fundamental training decisions
(whether or not to be a training firm and the num-
ber of training places) support both our structural
explanation and our assumptions on the relevance
of business expectations and their change over time
on these training decisions. Finally our results corre-
spond with theoretical assumptions on uncertainty.
The formation of individual firms’ business expecta-
tions by a given uncertainty over time seems, so far,
to be an underestimated explanation but a relevant
factor in firms’ contribution to human capital forma-
tion.
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